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Social assistance, custody and child poverty: cross national 
comparisons 
 
 
Abstract 
The prevalence of low income for children, especially for children in lone-parent families, varies 
considerably across countries. This paper considers five sets of hypotheses that may be relevant 
to the cross-national variability of child poverty. The tentative conclusion from this analysis in 
20 countries is that reducing child poverty, and in lone-parent families in particular, requires 
several approaches. Provisions that would discourage teenage childbearing would have their 
importance, as would opportunities for lone mothers to work. More important is the generosity 
of social expenditure applying to individuals and especially to families. The present analysis 
also shows the advantages of encouraging joint custody, along with special provisions for lone 
parents, and child support through advance maintenance payments.  
 
Keywords: child poverty, lone parent, social assistance, custody 
 
The prevalence of low income among children, especially for children living in lone-parent 
families, varies considerably across countries. Many authors have pondered over the differences 
showing that the rates of low income for children in lone-parent families are under 10 percent in 
countries like Belgium, Finland, and Sweden, while the rates are over 40 percent in Australia, 
Austria, Canada, Germany, United Kingdom, and the United States.  Several questions have 
been analysed in seeking to explain these differences: the extent to which mothers are considered 
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to be employable (Baker, 1996; Gornick et al., 1996; Millar, 1996; Lewis, 1993), the relative 
economic status of women (Kilkey and Bradshaw, 1999; Solera, 1998; Bianchi, 1996), the 
generosity of social assistance provisions (Phipps, 1999, 2001; Kenworthy, 1998; Smeeding et 
al., 1997; Baker, 1996), or the extent of compliance to support obligations from non-resident 
parents (Kunz et al., 2001; Garfinkel et al., 1998). Many studies focus on lone motherhood rather 
than on children in lone-parent families (e.g. Kiernan et al., 1998).  
 
 The purpose of this paper is to compare the relative importance of various possible 
factors in understanding the variation in these child poverty outcomes. While other studies make 
reference to the demographics (Nichols-Casebolt and Krysik, 1995; Rainwater and Smeeding, 
1995; Gornick and Pavetti, 1990), we will systematically consider the demographics associated 
with the prevalence of lone parenthood, the teenage fertility rate or the percent male in lone-
parent families. After considering the average per capita income, the next second set of variables 
considers the generosity of social transfers, and the transfers toward families in particular. The 
next set of considerations relates to women’s labour market status, particularly for lone parents. 
These explanatory factors are compared to three specific policy orientations: the extent of state 
involvement in ensuring child support, the extent of differential state support for lone parents, 
and the extent of joint custody.   
 
 
Theoretical context 
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The broad theoretical context is that of the relative priority given to the welfare of children by 
adults and by states. The intentions are typically good both from parents and at the level of the 
society. For instance, the demographic transition has been interpreted as a focus on quality rather 
than quantity of children.  In a recent Canadian survey on orientations to having children, there 
was a rather prevalent norm to the effect that one should not have children if one cannot properly 
care for them (Beaujot and Bélanger, 2001).  Asked why they would not have more than a given 
anticipated family size, the reasons were often described in terms of the time and energy that 
children take from you, given other things that you also want to do, and given that you want to 
do the very best for each child. 
 
 At the societal level, fewer children also allows more resources to be allocated for each 
child. Of course there are other needs both in families and at the societal level. At the societal 
level, one can argue that other needs have been heard more strongly. As a former Canadian 
Minister of Health from the 1980s, Bégin (1987) observed that among the three main client 
groups for social spending priority, the elderly had been most successful, women had 
intermediate success, and children had been the least successful.  
 
 Within families, the other needs include the well-being of adults themselves, which do 
not necessarily overlap with those of children. If the first demographic transition can be read as a 
move from child quantity to child quality, the second transition involves a series of family 
changes that have loosened marital relationships, as seen especially in the altered forms of entry 
and exit from relationships. While there are structural and institutional bases for this greater 
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looseness in relationships, the interpersonal side is that of giving more priority to one’s own 
satisfaction. The existential revolution in intimate relationships, that Giddens (1991) has seen in 
“pure relationships” and “reproductive individualism,” has meant that conflicts between the 
interests of the group and those of the individual are more legitimately resolved in terms of one’s 
own interests over those of the family group. The logic has certainly changed from a time when 
mothers not working was justified in terms of the best interests of the child. Keyfitz (1994: 7) 
observes that the presence of children, once the main reason not to divorce, no longer plays that 
role. In talking about the gender side of demographic change over the past century, Folbre 
(2000) also speaks of the greater legitimacy for women to make decisions based on self interest. 
These various changes, that demographers have associated with the second demographic 
transition, have meant that women’s parental roles have become increasingly separated from 
marital relationships, and men have become more likely to be informal parents of their partner’s 
children. For instance, in the 1994-95 Canadian Longitudinal Survey of Children and Youth, 
96.7% of all children under 12 were living with their mothers and 80.5% with their fathers 
(Beaujot, 2000: 271).   
 
 These theoretical considerations suggest that there are tensions at both the family and 
societal level. That is, there are good intentions to focus on the well-being of children, but there 
are other priorities that can conflict with the priority given to children, both for parents and for 
states. 
 
 Various factors appear relevant to explaining the extensive variability across countries in 
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the poverty rates of children, in particular for children in lone-parent families. Looking at the 
income package of the lowest quintile of children, Bradbury and Jantti (2001: 28) find that 50% 
or more of their income is due to transfers for Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, Ireland, 
France and the United States. At the other extreme of the distribution, 25% or less of the income 
package of the lowest quintile of children is due to transfers in Italy, Finland, Spain and 
Germany.  These authors conclude that market incomes are more important than transfers for 
reducing poverty. The generosity of social transfers needs to consider the overall level of social 
expenditure, but also the extent to which this transfer benefits children in comparison to other 
priorities, and the extent to which there are special provisions for lone parents. Also important 
are the market income of parents; this includes the extent to which parents, and mothers in 
particular, are working and the relative incomes of women. For children in lone-parent families, 
the labour market status of mothers would be particularly important, as are the transfers from the 
non-custodial parent. These transfers from the non-resident parent may in turn be partly a 
function of policies regarding custody and child support.  For instance, might there be better 
transfers when joint custody is promoted and the state is involved in ensuring child support. 
Given the needs of lone-parent families, the demographics may play a role, especially the 
relative numbers of children in two-parent and lone-parent families, the extent of teenage 
childbearing, and the proportion male among lone parents.  
 
International comparisons of child poverty 
 
    ---Table 1 about here--- 
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Poverty rates are here largely taken from the Luxembourg Income Study (2002). A relative 
measure is used that considers as poor those who are 50 percent below the median income. The 
measure is first determined at the household level, taking into account size and composition, then 
attributed to individuals in the household. While there are advantages to using measures of 
poverty that are based on the consumption of resources, international comparisons are easier 
when using a relative income measure. These relative measures are closely related to the 
consumption of resources and to various welfare outcomes. We have adopted here the measure 
of 50 percent below the median income since it is the most common measure. The terms poverty 
and low income are used interchangeably. Data are presented for both two-parent and lone-
mother families. Unfortunately, systematic data are not available for lone-father or total lone-
parent families. Also, these data do not enable us to separate never married and ever-married 
lone-mothers. The data on lone mothers are based on households where there is no spouse 
present. 
 
 We will largely use the poverty levels post-taxes and transfers, but have reproduced 
Table 1 that compares child poverty rates before and after government taxes and transfers 
(Smeeding et al., 1995). These data from the late 1980s to early 1990s indicate considerable 
variability especially in the post-transfer poverty rates for children living with lone mothers. 
Before transfers, these poverty rates are uniformly high, ranging from 32% in Italy to 80% in the 
Netherlands. However, there is a larger variation after transfers, from 60% poverty for children 
living with lone mothers in the United States, to 4% in Germany. This is the variability that 
 
 8
needs to be explained. How is it that countries like Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, 
Luxembourg, and Sweden had poverty rates for children with lone mothers of 10% or less, while 
these rates were above 40% in Australia, Canada, Ireland, and United States. It can be seen that 
the transfer system reduces the proportions poor by over 35 percentage points in Belgium, 
Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden and United 
Kingdom, but by less than 20 percentage points in the Australia, Italy, Switzerland and the 
United States. 
 
 Considering now only the post-transfer poverty rates, Table 2 presents the latest available 
data along with data from an earlier date. Poverty levels have declined for children in two-parent 
families in Canada, Luxembourg, and Sweden. It has declined in lone-mother families in 
Australia, Belgium, Canada, France and Norway. For France, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom and the United States, poverty levels have declined for total children. 
 
    ---Table 2 about here--- 
Demographic indicators 
 
Each set of indicators is carried in Appendix B, while Table 3 shows correlations of these 
indicators with three measures of child poverty. Our first set of hypotheses relates to 
demographics. In particular, might the level of child poverty of given countries be related to the 
relative predominance of children living with a lone mother, the fertility rate at ages under 20, 
and the percent of lone parents that are male? 
 
 9
 
    ---Table 3 about here--- 
 
 The percent of children living with lone mothers has increased in all countries except 
Austria and the Netherlands. In the latest data, this proportion varies from 3.0% in Japan to 
21.5% in the United States (Table B1). Leaving aside Japan on which we do not have 
comparable poverty data, the proportion of children living with lone mothers is lowest in Spain, 
Italy, Ireland and Netherlands, while it is highest in Sweden, United Kingdom, New Zealand and 
United States. On the other hand, the set of countries where child poverty rates are lowest 
include Sweden, Norway, Finland and Luxembourg, while they are highest in United States, 
Italy, United Kingdom and Australia. As would be expected from these distributions, there are 
only low correlations between the predominance of lone-mother families and the child poverty 
rates (Table 3). These correlations are nonetheless positive for the poverty rate among all 
children. There is slightly higher child poverty in single-mother families, along with lower 
poverty in two-parent families, when there are higher proportions of lone-mother children in 
given countries. It would appear that there is some relevance to the basic demographics to the 
effect that higher proportions of lone-mother families make it harder to reduce child poverty, 
especially in one-parent families. Bradbury and Jantti (2001) drew a similar conclusion: children 
have a greater likelihood of being poor when they are with a lone mother, but compared to other 
factors this is not an important reason for variation across countries.  
 
 The percent of lone parents who are male varies within a narrow range, from 9.5% in 
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Australia to 20% in Luxembourg. Nonetheless, the higher this proportion the lower the rates of 
child poverty.  
 
 Among the demographic indicators that were collected, the bi-variate correlation of child 
poverty is strongest with the fertility rate under age 20. These fertility rates vary extensively, 
from 58 per 1000 women aged 15-19 in the United States to under 10 in Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland and Sweden. The fertility rates 
for Canada and the United Kingdom are intermediate at about 25 per 1000 women aged 15-19. 
The correlation with child poverty is illustrated in Figure 1, where New Zealand is an outlier 
having relatively high fertility under age 20 but low poverty for children in lone-mother families, 
while Germany is an outlier in the other direction, with low fertility under 20 but high lone-
mother poverty rates. While the relations are clearly not systematic, it is important to observe 
that the demographics of teenage childbearing are more highly correlated with child poverty than 
the demographics of lone parenthood. 
 
    ---Figure 1 about here---  
 
Per capita income, social expenditure and transfers to families 
 
The next set of hypotheses relates to economic and social expenditure indicators (Table B2). We 
wish to see if the per capita income, the level of social expenditure, and the distribution of this 
expenditure, are associated with child poverty for all children and for children in lone-mother 
 
 11
families. While these are relative measures of income, richer countries would have more 
potential to reduce the proportion of children who are 50% below the median income. Higher 
GDP per capita is associated with slightly lower poverty in two parent families, but not for 
children in lone-parent families nor for all children. As other research indicates, higher national 
income does not produce lower real poverty (Bradbury and Jantti, 2001: 29).  
 
 The correlations are much higher, and always in the expected direction, between child 
poverty and levels of social expenditure. Measured as a percentage of GDP, the higher the 
public revenue, the higher the transfers to households and the higher the social security 
expenditure, the lower the child poverty levels (Table 3, Figure 2). 
 
 As would be expected, a higher proportion of family benefits (cash and service) in the 
total social security expenditure also reduces child poverty, however the correlation is stronger 
for two- parent than for lone-mother families. On the other hand, when health and pensions 
comprise a higher proportion of social expenditure, there is more child poverty. This can be 
further seen in the ratio of family cash benefits compared to pension and health benefits, which 
correlates with lower child poverty. Thus there appears to be some conflict between transfers to 
families and those to health and pensions. In countries like Australia, Finland, Luxembourg and 
New Zealand, family cash benefits are high compared to health and pensions benefits, while they 
are lower in Spain, United States and Italy. 
 
 At the same time, there are positive correlations between levels of poverty for children 
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and the elderly. There are also particularly high correlations between child poverty and poverty 
levels for the entire population. Thus the mechanisms for reducing poverty in the various parts of 
the population must be similar, and they largely involve higher levels of taxes and transfers. 
Nonetheless, the relative priority of transfers toward families, as contrasted with health and 
pensions, also benefits children in terms of lower rates of poverty. There is not evidence here 
that these mechanisms operate differently in two-parent and in lone-mother families, although 
family benefits through cash and services have more impact on poverty in two-parent families.   
 
    ---Figure 2 about here--- 
 
Labour market status of women 
 
Especially in lone-mother families, one would expect child poverty to be lower when women are 
more involved in the labour market. Bradshaw and Bjornberg (1997: 273) show that in eleven 
countries the poverty rates of lone mothers is invariably higher, and often much higher, if they 
are not working than if they are working. Millar (1996) makes the case that various structures of 
the labour force are relevant to poverty in lone-parent families, in particular employment rights, 
services supporting employment, opportunities for education and training, and the relative 
availability of full-time and part-time jobs. She then classifies countries according to the 
employment rates of lone mothers and all mothers, and concludes that the treatment of all 
mothers is key to the position of lone mothers. 
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 Table B3 shows various labour market indicators of  the relative status of women. The 
percent female in the labour force in 1995 varies from under 40% in Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg and Spain, to the range of 45 to 47% in Canada, Denmark, Finland, Norway, 
Sweden, and the United States. Higher proportions women in the labour force are related to 
lower poverty, but that is more so in two-parent than in lone-mother families (Table 3). The 
percent of labour force participation among married or cohabiting mothers is especially related 
to lower child poverty in two-parent families, while this participation in lone-mother families is 
associated with lower child poverty in corresponding families. In the latter comparison, New 
Zealand is an outlier with relatively low child poverty in lone-mother families while also low 
labour force participation for lone mothers; in contrast, United States, Canada and Australia are 
outliers with intermediate lone-mother labour force participation but high poverty for children in 
lone-mother families (Figure 3). 
 
    ---Figure 3 about here---  
 
 The proportion female among part-time workers is also negatively correlated with 
child poverty. The percent women among full-time workers is negatively related to child poverty 
in two-parent families, but shows minimal relation to child poverty in lone-mother families. An 
index confirms these results. Multiplying the percent female in the labour force by the proportion 
female in part-time workers, this index shows a negative relation to child poverty especially in 
two-parent families, but also in lone-mother families. In the wage rate comparison, female 
earnings as a percent of male earnings slightly reduce child poverty. Although these labour 
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market indicators show lower correlations with child poverty than the indicators of social 
expenditure, most of the results are in the expected direction. Two results are nonetheless 
surprising: the percent female among part-time workers reduces child poverty, and the percent 
female in full-time workers has no effect on child poverty in lone-mother families. Also, the 
earnings ratios show rather slight relationships; that is, female earnings as a percentage of male 
earnings only show a slight negative correlation with child poverty. It would appear that labour 
force participation, and proportions working full-time are particularly important to reducing 
poverty in two-parent families, while a larger proportion female among part-time workers also 
reduces child poverty. 
 
 Factors associated with the labour market status of women and their relative incomes 
were investigated by Baker (1996) when comparing two countries that tended to encourage 
young mothers to work (United States and Sweden) and two that encouraged them not to be 
employed (Australia and the Netherlands). As with Baker, we find that this variable is of limited 
importance in explaining the poverty levels of children in lone-mother families. The correlations 
are typically lower than with the indicators of social expenditure. The labour force participation 
rate of lone mothers does reduce associated child poverty, but other indicators of labour market 
show only weak relationships with child poverty in lone-mother families. 
 
Child custody and state involvement in child support 
 
This section considers three qualitative measures that pertain to child support, child custody and 
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special provisions for lone parents. For the most part, the information was obtained through 
expert informants from given countries (see also Appendix A). It is hypothesised that child 
poverty, especially in lone-parent families, would be reduced through greater state involvement 
in child support, greater prevalence of joint custody, and more generous provisions for lone-
parents. These measures would result in better transfers from the non-custodial parent, and from 
the state when the non-resident parent is in default or unable to pay child support. Table B4 
shows these indicators and the codes that were adopted.  
 
 These indicators are highly correlated to child poverty. In effect, child poverty is lower 
with greater state involvement in child support, especially through advance maintenance 
payments, along with differential state support for lone parents, and greater orientation to 
joint custody. For all children, these three indicators show a similar correlation with child 
poverty as the extent of public revenue as a percentage of GDP (Table 3). As with most other 
correlations, these measures show a stronger association with child poverty in two-parent than in 
lone-mother families. 
 
 There has been a prevalent orientation for mothers to have child custody, given their 
closer involvement in day-to-day care (Fine and Fine, 1994). However, there is also a 
recognition that non-resident fathers can be important to child well-being in ways that go beyond 
child support. Joint custody has increased, and certain countries have made joint custody the 
default condition in the case of separating parents (Garfinkel et al., 1998; Pearson and Thoennes, 
1998). Various concepts have been adopted. In New Zealand and Australia, the concept of 
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“guardianship” has been used, which is similar to the French “autorité parentale”. This is 
separate from the day-to-day residence of children, which remains more often with mothers. For 
instance, in the 1996 divorces in France, there was joint parental authority in 87% of cases, but 
86% of children resided with their mothers (Belmokhtar, 1999). Other countries use the single 
concept of “custody,” but the distinction can still be made between the overall custodial 
responsibility which may be joint, and the day-to-day living arrangements, or physical custody, 
which is rarely equally shared by parents. Since 1996, Australia has the default condition of 
shared parental responsibility. Joint guardianship is the default condition in New Zealand and 
shared parental authority in France, while joint legal custody is the default in Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden (Table B4). Except for 
Australia, Austria and Germany, these countries typically have lower child poverty (see Figure 
4); in the case of Austria joint custody is a recent provision. In Sweden, research suggests that 
joint custody has increased parental involvement with children (Bernhardt, 1996). Using data 
from Wisconson in 1986-94, Cancian and Meyer (1998) find that shared physical custody 
increases with parental income and with father’s share of total income. 
 
    ---Figure 4 about here--- 
 
 State involvement in child support typically takes one of two forms that are related to 
the degree of social responsibility for children (Client Research Unit, 2001; Corden, 1999). The 
state can be involved in reinforcing private responsibility, by establishing the appropriate level 
of child support and helping custodial parents to collect the child support payments. The other 
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model has  
generally been called advance maintenance, with the state providing the support and collecting  
as much as possible from the non-custodial parent. In some countries like Belgium, France, 
Germany, Ireland and Netherlands, the advance maintenance only applies to custodial parents 
who are on welfare. In effect, this becomes a system for states or municipalities to pay welfare to 
lone parents, then attempting to collect from the non-custodial parent. In other countries like 
Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, advance maintenance at a set level applies to all lone 
parents, although non-custodial parents can be required to directly pay further amounts to the 
custodial parent (Baker, 1995). 
 
 Compliance is a key question in child support, and reform efforts to increase compliance 
show mixed results (Kunz et al., 2001, Meyer and Bartfeld, 1996). Based on a 1995-96 survey of 
British fathers living apart from their children, Bradshaw et al. (1999) find that fathers are more 
likely to make child support payments if they have more contact with the child and had a longer 
relationship with the other parent, which would also be correlated with longer involvement with 
the child prior to parental separation. The most common reasons for not paying were 
unemployment and inability to afford the payments. About half of fathers never had formal 
arrangements, but the proportion who were current payers was slightly higher among those with 
no formal arrangements (idem, p. 134). In Canada, the payments are also higher when there is no 
formal arrangement (Marcil-Gratton and Le Bourdais, 1999). Some cases that are without formal 
arrangements may represent de facto joint custody. Cooperation may be easier when there are 
more resources, while scarcity can provoke conflict and state involvement.  
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 When the state involvement in child support takes the form of advance maintenance 
payments, there is lower poverty on average (Figure 5). Germany and Ireland are exceptions 
with relatively high child poverty, but the advance maintenance provisions in these two countries 
are minimal. On average, poverty is higher when state involvement takes the form of 
enforcement of child support. In this case the outliers are Luxembourg, New Zealand and 
Switzerland which have low child poverty in lone-mother families along with state involvement 
through enforcement of child support. 
 
    ---Figure 5 about here--- 
 
 Countries also differ considerably in the extent of differential state support for lone 
parents (see Gauthier,1996: 90). Besides the provisions available to all families, and to low-
income families in particular, some countries have additional provisions for lone parents. In 
Austria, lone parents have access to a tax credit, but this is also available to two-parent families 
where one partner is not gainfully employed. Canada uses an “equivalent to married” tax 
deduction wherein the first child of a lone-parent family receives the same tax deduction as a 
dependent spouse. Other countries have more generous provisions for lone parents. In France, 
this takes the form of Allocation Parent Isolé, while New Zealand has a Domestic Purposes 
Benefit, and Australia has a Single Parent Payment (Goodger, 1998). In the case of lone parents, 
Norway pays family allowance for one more child than the actual number of children, while lone 
parents in Finland receive higher family allowance.  Belgium and Denmark have various tax 
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provisions, along with access to social housing, that are beneficial to lone parents. With its 
universal advance maintenance system, Sweden has also been included in the list of countries 
with special provisions for lone parents. These countries all have relatively low child poverty 
(Figure 6). At the same time, Luxembourg, and Switzerland have low levels of child poverty in 
lone-mother families without these special provisions. In Luxembourg, the overall child benefit 
package is judged to be “high” (Millar, 1996: 102). 
 
    ---Figure 6 about here--- 
DISCUSSION 
 
Comparisons across countries are difficult, in part because data may not be systematic, and in 
part because there are alternate ways to achieve a given outcome like low levels of child poverty. 
Nonetheless, this analysis of 20 countries suggests that several societal features are correlated 
with the level of child poverty. The demographic variables are of lesser importance, but higher 
proportions of lone-mother families is correlated with lower levels of poverty in two-parent 
families and higher levels of poverty in lone-mother families. The fertility rate at ages under 20 
shows a somewhat stronger correlation with child poverty, especially in lone-mother families, 
while the percent male among lone parents is related to lower child poverty, especially for all 
children but also for children in lone-mother families.  
 
 The labour market characteristics of women are not strongly correlated with poverty rates 
of children in lone-mother families. The proportion female in the labour force and women’s 
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relative wage rates have the expected but weak relations to child poverty in lone-mother 
families; but counter to expectations poverty rates are slightly lower in countries where women 
comprise a larger proportion of part-time workers. On the other hand, a higher labour force 
participation among lone mothers is related to lower child poverty rates in lone-mother families. 
 It may be that the opportunities to work and women’s wage rates are not particularly relevant 
unless there is also good access and affordability in childcare, or unless there are policies for full 
employment (Baker, 1996). It can also make a difference whether women are pushed or pulled 
into the labour force. The encouragement to work, especially by labour market and family-
friendly provisions, provides a different context in comparison to stipulations that push women 
to work through such things as the removal of welfare support when young mothers are 
considered to be “employable” (see Smeeding et al., 1997).  
 
 The generosity of social programs, as indicated through social security expenditures as a 
percent of GDP, and the transfers to households as a percent of GDP, are more strongly 
correlated with child poverty than the labour market characteristics. In effect, there is a strong 
positive relation between the overall rate of poverty and that of children in lone-mother families. 
There is also indication that a higher concentration of social expenditure on family benefits, in 
contrast to old age and health benefits, is more efficient in reducing child poverty. While various 
typologies of welfare states have been used, it may be possible to develop a typology in 
accordance with the relative priority given to benefits for children and young families in contrast 
to elderly benefits. 
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 There is evidence that the policy context of custody, child support and the specific 
provisions for lone parents is also related to child poverty. State involvement through 
enforcement of child support obligations is less effective than advance maintenance payments. 
Sweden was a pioneer in the area of advance maintenance, with the collection from the non-
resident parents representing about 78% of what the state pays to lone parents through these 
payments (Millar, 1996: 104). In addition, provisions aimed specifically at lone mothers can 
reduce child poverty. In Norway, for instance, lone parents receive family allowance for one 
more than their actual number of children, in the amount of 9,948 NOK ($1400 US) per year. 
Child poverty is also lower on average when joint custody is defined as the default condition, 
possibly encouraging the continued involvement of both parents in the well-being of children.  
 
 In several ways, family change has benefited children. In particular, smaller family sizes, 
later ages at childbearing, and two-income families have permitted more transfers to children. At 
the same time, on average, children have been disadvantaged by looser marital bonds and the 
greater likelihood of living with only one parent or a step parent. In the Canadian case, the total 
of these changes was reducing the likelihood of child poverty over the period 1973 to 1988, but 
was increasing this prevalence over the period 1988-95 (Picot et al., 1998: 20). This is because 
the positive changes have largely run their course, but there is continued increase in the 
likelihood of living with a lone parent. In “Divorcing children: roles for parents and the state,” 
Richards (1994: 249) observes “that parental divorce often damages the life chances of children 
and the State could, and should, act more firmly to head off some of this damage.” Reflecting on 
the Swedish case, Bjornberg (2001) observes that laws do not seek to protect “The Family,” but 
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to protect the interest of the weaker parts within families, especially the children.   
 
 Children will obviously be less vulnerable if there are more state provisions for children 
and if both parents continue to give priority to their well-being. We would argue that the latter is 
more likely to occur if the care of children is better shared between women and men (Beaujot, 
2000). Stated differently, better sharing would reduce the cost of children to women. There is 
limited scope for policy involvement in regard to promoting the better sharing of child care by 
women and men in and out of marriage, but the default condition of joint custody may signal this 
orientation, and may encourage better involvement on the part of the non-resident parent. We 
also need better statistics on men’s involvement with childcare. For instance, there are various 
compilations on lone-mother families, but we could not locate any basic international 
comparisons on lone-father families. In many instances, one-parent families are only tabulated as 
lone-mother families, and treated as a women’s issue (e.g. United Nations, 2000).   
 
 From the point of view of women, another policy issue is whether to treat all mothers the 
same or to treat lone mothers separately (Kilkey and Bradshaw, 1999; Millar, 1996). Taking the 
point of view of children, the main thrust of provisions needs to refer to all children, and to 
children living in low-income families in particular. However, our analysis suggests that child 
poverty is on average lower if there are special provisions for children living in a lone-parent 
family, and if advance maintenance is used instead of enforcement of child support. Another 
question regards the extent to which special provisions for lone parents and advance 
maintenance should apply only to lone parents who are on welfare, or to all lone parents. While 
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welfare provisions can be effective in reducing the depth of child poverty, they do not 
compensate for the disadvantages of living with one parent, especially when the other parent is 
unable or unwilling to parent.  
 
 Our conclusion is that reducing child poverty, and in lone-parent families in particular, 
requires several approaches. Provisions that would discourage teenage childbearing would have 
their importance, as would opportunities for lone mothers to work. More important is the 
generosity of social expenditure applying to individuals and especially to families with low 
income. Besides, this analysis points to the importance of provisions such as joint custody that 
encourage involvement on the part of the non-resident parent, along with particular arrangements 
like advance maintenance payments when the other parent is incapacitated, and special 
provisions for lone parents. Several countries use enforcement provisions to collect child support 
payments from non-custodial parents who are in default. However, these provisions are pale in 
comparison to advance maintenance payments, or paying higher benefits to lone-mother families 
(see also Freiler and Cerny, 1998, Desrosiers et al., 1997, and Hunsley, 1997). Collecting from 
non-custodial parents does not solve the problem when they are unable to pay.  
 
 Societies have largely found means of accommodating for the death of parents, through 
life insurance and adoption, and for the economic incapacity of parents if that incapacity occurs 
at work, through worker’s compensation, employment insurance, and the disability provisions of 
the pension plans. However, many societies have not found means to accommodate when the 
incapacity occurred in other circumstances. The provisions for low-income families solve part of 
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this problem, but advance maintenance and specific provisions for lone parents have the 
advantage of state support regardless of the circumstance that makes the non-custodial parent 
unable or unwilling to provide.      
 
Acknowledgement: The authors are indebted to the Luxembourg Income Study, which was used 
as the source for much of the data. We are also thankful to the various informants listed in 
Appendix A. All errors are the responsibility of the authors. 
 
 
References 
 
Baker, Maureen. 1995. Canadian family policies: cross-national comparisons. Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press. 
Baker, Maureen. 1996. “Social assistance and the employability of mothers: two models from 
cross-national research.” Canadian Journal of Sociology 21,4: 483-503. 
Beaujot, Roderic. 2000. Earning and caring in Canadian families. Peterborough: Broadview. 
Beaujot, Roderic and Alain Bélanger. 2001. Perspectives on below replacement fertility in 
Canada: trends, desires, and accommodations. Paper presented at International Union for the 
Scientific Study of Population workshop on low fertility, Tokyo, March 2001. 
Bégin, Monique. 1987. “Demographic change and social policy: implications and possible 
alternatives.” In S. Seward (Ed.), The future of social welfare systems in Canada and the 
United Kingdom. Ottawa: Institute for Research on Public Policy. 
Belmokhtar, Zakia. 1999. Les divorces en 1996: une analyse statistique des jugements 
prononcés. Paris: Ministère de la Justice. 
Bernhardt, Eva. 1996. “Non-standard parenting among Swedish men.” Pp. 91-102 in U. 
Bjornbert and A.-K. Kollind (Eds.), Men’s Family Relations. Stockholm: Almquist and 
Wicksell International. 
Bianchi, Suzanne. 1996. “A cross-national look at married women’s economic dependency.” 
Luxembourg Income Study Discussion Paper # 143. 
Bjornberg, Ulla. 2001. “Cohabitation and marriage in Sweden: does family matter?” Manuscript. 
Bradbury, Bruce and Markus Jantti. 2001. “Child poverty across the industrialised world: 
evidence from the Luxembourg Income Study.” Pp. 11-33 in Koen Vleminckx and Timothy 
Smeeding (Eds.), Child well-being, child poverty and child policy in modern nations. 
Bristol: The Policy Press. 
Bradshaw, Jonathan and Ulla Bjornberg. 1997. “Lone mothers, policy and employment in 20 
 
 25
countries.” Pp. 259-284 in Philip de Jong and Theodore Marmor (Eds.), Social policy and 
the labour market. Aldvershort: Ashgate. 
Bradshaw, Jonathan, Carol Stimson, Christine Skinner and Julie Williams. 1999. Absent 
Fathers? London: Routledge. 
Cancian, Maria and Daniel Meyer. 1998. “Who gets custody?” Demography 35(2): 147-157. 
Client Research Unit. 2001. Child support schemes: Australia and comparisons. Australia: Child 
Support Agency. 
Corden, Anne. 1999. Making child maintenance regimes work. York: Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation.   
Desrosiers, Hélène, Heather Juby and Céline Le Bourdais. 1997. “La diversification des 
trajectoires parentales des hommes - Conséquences pour la ‘politique du père,’” Lien social 
et politique - RIAC, 37: 19-31. 
Fine, Mark and David Fine. 1994. “An examination and evaluation of recent changes in divorce 
laws in five Western countries: the critical role of values.” Journal of Marriage and Family 
56(2): 249-263. 
Folbre, Nancy. 2000. “Sleeping beauty awakes: feminism and fertility decline in the Twentieth 
Century.” Paper Presented at the meetings of the Population Association of America, Los 
Angeles, March 2000. 
Freiler, Christa and Judy Cerny. 1998. Benefiting Canada’s children: Perspectives on gender and 
social responsibility. Ottawa: Status of Women Canada. 
Garfinkel, Irwin, Daniel Meyer and Sara McLanahan. 1998. “A brief history of child support 
polices in the United States.” Pp. 14-30 in Daniel Meyer and Judith Seltzer Garfinkel, Irwin, 
Sara McLanahan, Daniel Meyer and Judith Seltzer (Eds.), Fathers under fire: The revolution 
in child support enforcement. New York. Russell Sage. 
Gauthier, Anne Hélène. 1996. The state and the family. Oxford: Clarendon. 
Giddens, Anthony. 1991. Modernity and self-identity: self and society in the late modern age. 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Goodger, Kay. 1998. Maintaining sole parent families in New Zealand: an historical review. 
Social Policy Journal of New Zealand Vol. 10 (June 1998). 
Gornick, Janet and LaDonna Pavetti. 1990. “A demographic model of poverty among families 
with children.” Luxembourg Income Study Discussion Paper # 65. 
Gornick, Janet, Marcia Meyers and Katherin Ross. 1996. “Supporting the employment of 
mothers: policy variation across fourteen welfare states.” Luxembourg Income Study 
Discussion Paper # 139. 
Hunsley, Terrance. 1997. Lone parent incomes and social policy outcomes: Canada in 
international perspective. Kingston, Ont.: School of Policy Studies, Queen’s University. 
Kenworthy, Lane. 1998. “Do social-welfare policies reduce poverty? A cross-national 
assessment.” Luxembourg Income Study Discussion Paper # 188. 
Keyfitz, Nathan.1994. “Preface.” Cahiers Québécois de Démographie 23 (1): 3-10. 
Kiernan, Kathlene, Hilary Land and Jane Lewis. 1998. Lone motherhood in Twentieth-Century 
Britain: From footnote to front page. Oxford: Claredon Press. 
Kilkey, Majella and Jonathan Bradshaw. 1999. “Lone mothers, economic well-being, and 
policies.” Pp. 127-184 in Diane Sainsbury (Ed.), Gender and welfare state regimes. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
 26
Kunz, James, Patrick Villeneuve and Irwin Garfinkel. 2001. “Child support among selected 
OECD countries: a comparative analysis.” Pp. 485-500 in Koen Vleminckx and Timothy 
Smeeding (Eds.), Child well-being, child poverty and child policy in modern nations. 
Bristol: The Policy Press. 
Lefebvre, Pierre, Philip Merrigan, and Stéphane Gascon. 1996. “La pauvreté des enfants au 
Canada de 1973 à 1993.” In Jacques Alary and Louise Ethier (Eds.), Comprendre la famille. 
Quebec: Presses de l'Université du Québec. 
Lewis, Jane. 1993. “Introduction: women, work, family and social polices in Europe.” Pp. 1-24 
in Jane Lewis (Ed.), Women and social policies in Europe: work, family and the state. 
Hants: Edward Elgar. 
Luxembourg Income Study. 2002. LIS Key Figures. www.lisproject.org/keyfigures.htm 
Marcil-Gratton, Nicole and Céline Le Bourdais. 1999. Custody, access and child support: 
findings from the National Longitudinal Survey of Children and Youth. Ottawa: Child 
Support Team, Department of Justice. 
Meyer, Daniel and Judi Bartfeld. 1996. “Compliance with child support orders in divorce cases.” 
Journal of Marriage and Family 58 (1): 201-212. 
 
Millar, Jane. 1996. “Mothers, workers, wives: comparing policy approaches to supporting lone 
mothers.” Pp. 97-113 in Elizabeth Bortolaia Silva (Ed.), Good enough mothering? Feminist 
perspectives on lone mothering. New York: Routledge. 
National Insurance Administration. 2000. The rights of parents of small children in Norway. 
Oslo: National Insurance Administration. 
Nichols-Casebolt, Ann and Judy Krysik. 1995. “The economic well-being of never- and ever-
married single mothers: a cross national comparison.” Luxembourg Income Study 
Discussion Paper # 131. 
Pearson, Jessica and Nancy Thoennes. 1998. “Programs to increase fathers’ access to their 
children.” Pp. 220-252 in Daniel Meyer and Judith Seltzer Garfinkel, Irwin, Sara 
McLanahan, Daniel Meyer and Judith Seltzer (Eds.), Fathers under fire: The revolution in 
child support enforcement. New York. Russell Sage. 
Phipps, Shelley. 1999. “What is the best mix of policies for Canada’s children?: an international 
comparison of policies and outcomes for young children.” Luxembourg Income Study 
Discussion Paper # 201. 
Phipps, Shelley. 2001. “Values, policies and the well-being of young children in Canada, 
Norway and the United States.” Pp. 79-98 in Koen Vleminckx and Timothy Smeeding 
(Eds.), Child well-being, child poverty and child policy in modern nations. Bristol: The 
Policy Press. 
Picot, Garnett, John Myles, and Wendy Pyper. 1998. “Markets, families and social transfers: 
trends in low-income among the young and old, 1973-95.” Pp. 11-30 in M. Corak (Ed.), 
Labour Markets, Social Institutions and the Future of Canada's Children. Ottawa: Statistics 
Canada, cat. no. 89-553. 
Rainwater, Lee and Timothy Smeeding. 1995. Doing poorly: the real income of American 
children in a comparative perspective. Luxembourg Income Study Discussion Paper # 127. 
Rashid, Abdul.1999. “Family income: 25 years of stability and change.” Perspectives on Labour 
and Income 11 (1): 9-15.  
 
 27
Richards, Martin. 1994. “Divorcing children: roles for parents and the state.” Pp. 249-264 in 
John Eekelaar and Mavis Maclean (Eds.), Family law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Smeeding, Timothy, Sheldon Danzinger, and Lee Rainwater. 1995. “The welfare state in the 
1990s: toward a new model of anti-poverty policy for families with children.” Manuscript, 
Luxembourg Income Study. 
Smeeding, Timothy, Sheldon Danziger and Lee Rainwater. 1997. “Making social policy work 
for children: towards a more effective antipoverty policy.” Pp. 368-389 in Giovanni Andrea 
Cornia and Sheldon Danziger (Eds.), Child poverty and deprivation in the industrialized 
countries, 1945-1995. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Solera, Cristina. 1998. “Income transfers and support for mothers’ employment: the link to 
family poverty risks.” Luxembourg Income Study Discussion Paper # 192. 
Statistics Canada. 2000. Women in Canada. Ottawa: Statistics Canada. 
Statistics Canada. 1975a. “1971 Census of Canada: Husband-Wife Families.” Catalogue 93-920. 
Pp. 60-2 
Statistics Canada. 1975b. “1971 Census of Canada: one-parent families.” Catalogue 93-921. Pp. 
64-2 
 
Statistics Canada. 1997. “1996 Census: Marital Status, common-law Unions and Families.” The 
Daily Oct. 14, 1997. Pp. 5.  
United Nations, 2000. The World’s Women. New York, United Nations 
Zyblock, Myles. 1996. “Child poverty trends in Canada.” Human Resources Development 
Canada, Working Paper W-96-1E. 
 
 
Appendix A. Custody, state involvement in ensuring child support, and provisions for lone 
parents, 20 countries.  
 
Note: These data are coded in Tables B4 and B1. 
 
Australia: Joint custody mostly the case (default) for guardianship (major decisions like 
education). Since 1996, “guardianship” has been replaced by the notion of parental 
responsibility, “custody” by “residence” and “access/visitation” by “contact.” For the most part, 
where child lives is not decided by courts, residence can be joint if worked out by parents. Child 
support assessed on the basis of level of income of both parents. Parents on social assistance 
must take reasonable action to collect child support and this is deducted from the welfare 
payments so that welfare payments for children are only a top-up to child support payments. In 
June 2001, 9.5% male payees from Australian Child Support Scheme, covers 85-95% of all sole 
parent families. (Peter McDonald, Colin Matthers, Allan Shephard, Margaret Harrison, Bruce 
Smyth).          
     
Austria: Joint custody is permitted as of 1 July 2001, since then it is the normal form but in the 
first six months of operation, it seems that joint custody is still not very common; if parents do 
not agree the judge decides (Maria Steck). In 2000, among all children living with a lone parent, 
12.7% were living with father (Statistics Austria). The state enforces child support by collecting 
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from the absent parent; if the parent is out of the country or incapable of paying, the parent can 
collect from the state. Some two or three years ago, probably at least 75% of custody was 
granted to the mother (Astrid Deixler-Hubner). Lone parents have access to a tax credit (negative 
income tax), also available to two-parent families where one partner is not gainfully employed 
(Helmut Wintersberger). 
 
Belgium: Joint custody is the default condition; the courts may but rarely do deviate from this 
arrangement. Child support is collected from absent parent but they may escape. There is an 
“embryo” of state advance in the form of commune level social services; they sometimes 
advance payments to be collected later from the absent parent. The targeted schemes for lone 
parents include extra tax cuts, priority in social housing; also the general tax and social security 
system is favourable for single parents. There are no centralized judicial statistics to obtain data 
on custody arrangements. The 17.3% male among lone parents is from the 1991 census; it is 
slightly over-estimated because it includes some cases where a lone-parent family lives with 
their own parent who may be listed as head of the family (Johan Surkyn). 
 
Canada: Joint custody has increased from 1.2% in 1986 to 27.6% in 1997, but this is just for 
court orders (Statistics Canada, 2000). State is involved in enforcing child support, on the bases 
of a formula. Minimal additional support for lone parents besides that offered to low-income 
families; this takes the form of an “equivalent to married income tax deduction” where the first 
child of a lone-parent family receives the same deduction as a dependent spouse (Rod Beaujot). 
 
Denmark: Joint custody is the default condition, even for couples who were cohabitants rather 
than married. Housing subsidies are such that lone parents have advantages, based on income 
level and number of people in the household, parts of the curve benefit lone parents to the point 
that there is a debate regarding people who still live together but divorce in order to declare a 
lone-parent family. The majority are joint custody but the figures are not known because the 
courts do not register this information. On 1 January 2001, for children under 18 living with one 
parent, 11.1% are living with the father (Jens Bonke).    
 
Finland: A 1984 law launched the definition of joint custody, 91% joint in 2000, 1999 law has 
advance maintenance of 702 FIM (118 EUR) which the state then seeks to collect from absent 
parent. Family allowance is increased by 33 EUR for children of single parents (Muuri Anu) 
 
France: Parental authority is supposed to be joint. State may pay food pension directly to mother 
and collect from father, but they are reluctant because this is aggressive to father (Laurent 
Toulemon, Brigitte Munoz-Perez with booklet). There are two benefits for lone parents: 
Allocation Soutien Familial benefit for families with no second parent, and Allocation de Parent 
Isolé which is means tested (Client Research Unit, 2001: 12). The 1990 census shows 12.5% 
male among lone parents with children under 20. The 1994 survey gives 9.2% living with father 
among children living with only one parent.     
 
Germany: Only one parent has legal custody, other arrangements are private. Advance 
maintenance payments which is then collected (demand of payment) from the absent parent 
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(Birgit Fix). In 2000, the mother had custody in 21.6% of cases, father in 1.5, joint for 75.5 and 
other in 1.4%. There is a male head in 16.6% of lone-parent families (Htrud Beyer).  
 
Ireland: Joint custody is allowed on a case by case basis, as the court determines is in the best 
interest of the child; when there was no marriage, the father can petition for guardianship. But 
joint custody is probably under 10%, the majority are mothers; even with joint custody the 
mother is typically responsible for day to day questions. Parents are liable to support their 
children; for lone parents on welfare the state pays the benefit and seeks to collect from the 
absent parent, assessed on the means of the absent parent, up to the full amount of the welfare. 
For lone parents who are not on welfare, the courts can order payments which can be taken from 
earnings. The “one-parent family benefit” is available regardless of how the parent got to be a 
lone parent, to lone parents on welfare. This pays allowable receipted child care costs to parents 
on welfare where the lone parent is working and receiving a certain level of welfare. These 
childcare costs are allowed within a means test, with gradual reduction in the amount received on 
welfare when the lone parent returns to work. Childcare costs are not allowable for tax deduction 
for lone parents not on welfare. According to the last quarter of 2001, there were 22,400 male 
and 152,600 female lone-parent families with children under 18. When it is men lone parents, the 
majority (73%) have all children over age 15 (Valerie Richardson). 
 
Italy: Divorce requires three years of separation, both are low, joint custody permitted as of 
1970, 3.9% joint custody in 1998 (Rossella Palomba) 
 
Japan: Joint custody is not allowed, most divorces are not through the court, minimal state 
involvement in collecting child support. In 1995 census, 3.0% of children under 18 are living 
with a lone-mother, 13.5% of lone parents are male and 13.2 % of children under 18 living with 
a lone parent are living with a lone-father (Kiyosi Hirosima). 
 
Luxembourg: There are some joint custody in fact, but does not know how this is handled 
legally, no advance maintenance payments, minimal specific support for lone parents (some 
things with taxation), custody allocation not available. In the 1991 census, there were 11,497 
(7.9% of households) lone parent households, of which 20% were fathers with children (Irene 
Zanardelli). Generosity of child-benefit package judged to be “high” for lone parents (Millar, 
1996: 102). 
 
Netherlands: Client Research Unit (2001: 14-15) says that there are no special benefits for lone 
parents; child support system has only been operational since 1997, no system of advance 
maintenance. Since 1998, joint legal custody (“joint-parental authority”) is the default condition, 
both parents stay responsible for the education and upbringing of the child, a given parent can 
petition for sole custody but the court is not inclined to grant these requests unless the parents 
have such serious communication problems that the welfare of the children is in danger. In 1999 
some 62% were joint at that is higher now. If there is a conflict, one parent can petition the court 
for sole custody. Mothers on welfare receive child support from the state and the state collects if 
possible from the absent parent. No other special provisions for lone parents. (Erik Nicolai). On 
1 Jan 2001, in 85% of lone-parent families the parent is a woman (Marloes Lammerts) 
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New Zealand: Under the Guardianship Act 1968, both biological parents have guardianship over 
their child (the right to make decisions regarding education and well-being, regardless of the 
custody arrangements (day-to-day living arrangements of the child). State enforces child support 
which is assessed on the income of the non-custodial parent; parents on social assistance are 
required to name the liable parent for collection of child support, with a financial penalty for 
non-compliance. Child support is paid directly to custodial parent if they are not on social 
assistance, and retained by the government if they are on social assistance and the amount is less 
than the rate of benefit payable. The Domestic Purposes Benefit has varied over time but it was 
established as a statutory benefit for lone parents in 1973 (Goodger, 1998). The data on custody 
arrangements by parents date from 1990; they are no longer collected (Kay Goodger). For 
children under 18 who are not in full-time employment in 1996, 12.5% of those living with only 
one parent lived with a father. The child poverty rates (disposable income) in 1996 were 15.4% 
for children living with one parent, 6.4% with two parents and 7.8% for all children. The 
Domestic Purposes Benefit is just around the 50% threshold, and it is good at keeping sole 
parents out of extreme poverty, but not good at removing less extreme poverty or hardship (Bob 
Stephens).  In 1996, 21% of dependent children under 18 lived with a lone mother, 3% with a 
lone father, 24% overall (Kay Goodger). 
 
Norway: There is a child support advance of NOK 13,440 per child per year, lone parents 
entitled to child benefit for one child more than they actually have (National Insurance 
Administration, 2000). Default condition is joint custody, unless the parents agree differently; if 
parents have never married, mother has sole custody unless the parents have agreed differently. 
About 10 percent of lone parents are male (Marit Ronsen, Randi Kjeldstad). The courts can 
decide on joint legal custody, but not on joint physical custody; 90% of married couples choose 
to have joint legal custody after divorce, there are not statistics on the unmarried couples. About 
10% of children under age 18 who live with a lone parent, lives with the father (Birgitte 
Gulbrandsen). A sample survey done by Jensen and Clausen in 1997 shows that 88% of children 
live with their mother, 8% with their father and 4% stay 50% with each parent, that is joint 
physical custody after separation of both married and unmarried couples. 
 
Spain: Custody is practically always allocated to the mother, fathers rarely have custody, joint 
custody does not exist. The courts can order non-paying fathers to pay child support. Until 1999, 
there were no special provisions for lone parents, but now they have a personal minimum tax 
deduction of 5410 euros compared to 3305 for others.   
 
Sweden: Joint custody is the default option for married and previously married parents, and it 
can be invoked by parents who are not married. This refers to legal custody, not actual physical 
custody; parents are to make joint decisions in matters that deal with the child, for example with 
whom the child should reside, visitation rights, which school the child should attend. After 
separation, 84% of children co-reside with their mother and 16% with their father. Advance 
maintenance, with the state paying the resident parent and collecting as much as possible from 
the absent parent. Of children whose biological parents separated in 1999, 9% have mother only, 
0.4% father and 90% joint custody. For all children 1-17 not living with both parents it is 12% 
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mother, 1% father and 87% joint.  (Eva Bernhardt, Elisabeth Landgren-Moller). 
 
Switzerland: According the former law as well as according the revised divorce law (in force 
since 2000), custody has to respect the children’s well-being. Empirically, more than 4 out of 5 
children co-reside with their mother. The proportion of joint-custody is increasing. However, 
there exist hardly any valid data, due in part to the fact that cantonal jurisdiction has a wide room 
to interpret the federal law. A huge heterogeneity between cantons is the result (Beat Fux). 
 
United Kingdom: Custody is defined as parental responsibility rather than custody; residence 
orders are 90% with the mother, 10% with the mother, “joint and other” are not used. The state 
sets levels of child support and collects these through Child Support Agency, mothers on benefit 
must use this system, this is then largely deducted from their benefits. Lone parents get a small 
supplement to welfare payments and to the universal child benefit. (Mavis Maclean, Jane Lewis) 
 
United States: States are required to withhold child support obligations from wages of non-
resident parents who are delinquent. Joint custody authorized in 43 states (Garfinkel et al., 1998: 
23, 222). There is no family allowance and minimal differential support for lone parents. After 
the 1996 welfare reform, lone mothers can only receive five years of welfare in their lifetime 
(Chien-chung Huang). Among custodial parents of children under 21 living in families that had a 
parent not living in the home in 1998, 19.7% had a joint custody agreement, and 14.9% of 
custodial parents were fathers (Table B of Current Population Reports, October 2000, P60-212). 
 
Tables 
 
Table 1 
Child poverty rates before and after government taxes and transfers, 18 countries, about 
1990 
 
 ---Pre-transfer child poverty rates---
 
---Post-transfer child poverty rates-- Percent lone 
mothers in 
total families 
 All 
children 
Two-parent 
households 
Lone 
mothers 
All 
children 
Two-parent 
households 
Lone 
mothers 
 
Australia 1989 19.6 11.5 73.2 14.0 7.7 56.2 12.4 
Belgium 1992 16.2 13.1 50.7 3.8 3.2 10.0 8.1 
Canada 1991 22.5 14.9 68.2 13.5 7.4 50.2 13.4 
Denmark 1992 16.0 10.6 45.0 3.3 2.5 7.3 14.3 
Finland 1991 11.5 8.6 36.3 2.5 1.9 7.5 9.5 
France 1984 25.4 22.8 56.4 6.5 5.4 22.6 6.5 
Germany 1989 9.0 5.2 43.9 6.8 2.3 4.2 9.9 
Ireland 1987 30.2 28.0 72.6 12.0 10.5 40.5 5.3 
Israel 1986 23.9 21.6 61.3 11.1 10.3 27.5 5.1 
Italy 1991 11.5 10.6 31.7 9.6 9.5 13.9 4.4 
Luxembourg 1985 11.7 8.4 55.7 4.1 3.6 10.0 6.8 
Netherlands 1991 13.7 7.7 79.7 6.2 3.1 39.5 8.4 
New Zealand 1996 30.0 20.9 79.1 7.8 6.4 15.4 21.0 
Norway 1991 12.9 4.4 57.4 4.6 1.9 18.4 15.4 
Sweden 1992 19.1 12.5 54.9 2.7 2.2 5.2 14.6 
Switzerland 1982 5.1 1.9 33.7 3.3 1.0 25.6 6.9 
U. K. 1982 29.6 22.1 76.2 9.9 8.4 18.7 13.0 
U. S. 1991 25.9 13.9 69.9 21.5 11.1 59.5 21.2 
 
Note: Date shown by country is date of latest data.  
 
Source: Smeeding, Danzinger, and Rainwater, 1995. For New Zealand, estimates were made based on data 
from Bob Stephens. 
 
Table 2 
Total, elderly and child poverty rates by family type, and percent of children living in 
lone-mother families in 20 countries, around 1986 and 1996 
 
Country --------------Around 1986----------------- -----------------Around 1996----------------- 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Australia (94) 
 
11.9 
 
24.3 
 
14.0 
 
9.8 
 
62.2 
 
8.4 
 
14.3 
 
29.4 
 
15.8 
 
12.0 
 
46.3 
 
10.6 
Austria (95) 6.7 18.5 4.8 9.3 29.8 13.0 10.6 10.3 15.0 12.9 44.0 10.8 
Belgium (96)  4.5 10.9 4.0 3.2 19.9 4.7 7.4 15.1 6.3 6.1 8.0 8.9 
Canada (97) 11.4 10.8 14.8 11.6 50.3 9.9 11.9 5.3 15.7 10.9 45.7 14.8 
Denmark (97) 10.1 31.5 4.7 4.3 7.3 12.0 9.2 6.6 8.7 5.1 30.2 14.1 
Finland (95) 5.4 11.9 2.8 2.4 6.9 9.0 5.1 5.2 4.2 3.9 8.3 11.0 
France (94) 8.9 14.7 8.3 6.0 29.9 8.9 8 9.8 7.9 6.0 25.3 9.3 
Germany (94) 6.5 10.3 6.4 5.5 37.6 4.8 7.5 7 10.6 6.5 46.2 10.9 
Ireland (87)       11.1 14.4 13.8 14.4 35.4 5.3 
Italy (95) 10.4 13.1 11.4 11.1 18.6 5.1 14.2 12.2 20.2 20.3 30.6 5.2 
Japan (95)            3.0 
Luxembourg (94) 5.3 12.7 5.2 3.6 17.6 8.0 3.9 6.7 4.5 3.3 19.3 9.6 
Netherlands (94) 4.7 0.3 5.2 4.8 9.8 11.0 8.1 6.4 8.1 6.3 26.4 7.6 
New Zealand (96)   6.7 6.1 13.8 14.0   7.8 6.4 15.4 21.0 
Norway (95)  7.2 21.7 4.3 2.0 23.1 10.3 6.9 14.5 3.9 2.1 13.5 15.2 
Spain  (90)       10.1 11.3 12.2 12.5 25.4 4.9 
Sweden (95) 7.5 7.2 10.0 13.5 3.5 3.2 6.6 2.7 2.6 1.5 6.6 19.2 
Switzerland (92)  9.3 8.4 24.4 6.9 10.0 9.1 9.3 8.4 10.0 9.1 16.0 8.9 
U.K. (95) 9.1 7 26.0 9.5 12.5 11.9 13.4 13.7 19.8 13.9 43.5 20.7 
U.S. (97) 17.8 23.5 52.1 21.6 25.0 15.9 16.9 20.7 22.4 14.0 52.5 21.5 
 
Note: Poverty rates are post taxes and transfers, based on persons in households with less than half of the      
median income (see text). 
Columns: 
1. Total population poverty rate 
2. Elderly poverty rate 
3. Poverty rate for all children 
4. Poverty rate for children in two parent family 
5. Poverty rate for children in lone mother families 
6. Percent of children living in lone-mother families 
Date shown by country is date of latest data.  
Source: “Relative Poverty Rates for the Total Population, Children and the Elderly,” LIS Key Figures. 
             “Poverty Rates for Children by Family Type,” LIS Key Figures. 
From Web site: lisweb.ceps.lu/keyfigures/childpovrates.htm and 
lisweb.ceps.lu/keyfigures/povertytable.htm 
For New Zealand, estimates were made based on data from Bob Stephens. For Japan, census data are 
shown. 
Table 3 
Correlations of child poverty with various indicators, about 1996 
 
Correlation (Pearson's r)  1 2 3 
Percentage of children living in lone-mother families 0.138 -0.193 0.209 
Fertility under 20 0.553* 0.309 0.495* 
Total Fertility Rate -0.112 -0.233 -0.158 
Percent of lone parent families that are male -0.335 -0.303 -0.288 
   
GDP per capita in US$ -0.078 -0.227 0.061 
Public revenue, percentage of GDP -0.705** -0.620* -0.665** 
Transfers to households, percentage of GDP -0.663** -0.533* -0.590* 
Social security expenditure, percentage of GDP -0.658** -0.624** -0.533* 
Public expenditure on health, percentage of GDP -0.350 -0.500* -0.092 
Old age and health, percentage of social expenditure 0.632** 0.591** 0.492* 
Family cash benefit, percentage of social expenditure -0.304 -0.321 -0.163 
Family cash and services, percentage of social expenditure -0.451 -0.543* -0.243 
Ratio of family cash benefit to old age and health benefits -0.423 -0.424 -0.284 
   
Elderly poverty rate 0.514* 0.460 0.419 
Total population poverty rate 0.945** 0.850** 0.747** 
    
Labour force: percentage female -0.243 -0.484* -0.113 
Part time: percentage female -0.263 -0.241 -0.141 
INDEX = product of last two rows -0.406 -0.568* -0.205 
Full time: percentage female -0.209 -0.466* -0.053 
Labour participation rate of married/cohabiting mothers -0.372 -0.571* -0.337 
Labour participation rate of lone mothers -0.247 -0.238 -0.326 
Female earnings as percentage of male earnings -0.141 -0.162 -0.082 
   
Extent of joint custody -0.672** -0.739** -0.446 
      Default condition or 60% or higher -0.688** -0.732** -0.365 
      Not permitted or under 5% 0.472* 0.592** 0.131 
Extent of state involvement in ensuring child support from absent 
parent (Spearman's rho or rank correlation coefficient) 
-0.607** -0.603** -0.355 
      Minimal 0.308 0.530* -0.008 
      Enforcement of child support 0.422 0.262 0.411 
      Advance maintenance payments -0.607** -0.585** -0.402 
Extent of differential state support for lone parents -0.679** -0.676** -0.686** 
 
Note: 
1. Percentage of child poverty  
2. Percentage of child poverty in two parents families  
3. Percentage of child poverty in single mother families 
4. * Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).  
5. ** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Source: see Tables 2, B1-B4
Table B1 
Demographic indicators on lone parenthood and family, in 20 countries 
 
Country  Percent of 
children in lone 
mother family 
(1986) 
Percent of 
children in lone 
mother family 
(1996) 
Percent of lone 
parents that are 
male (1996) 
Fertility (<20) 
(1996) 
TFR 
(1996) 
Australia   8.4 10.6 9.5 20.5 1.82 
Austria     13.0 10.8 12.7 17.5 1.40 
Belgium     4.7 8.9 17.3 11.9 1.55 
Canada      9.9 14.8 16.9 24.5 1.64 
Denmark     12.0 14.1 11.1 8.8 1.80 
Finland     9.0 11.0 15.5 9.8 1.81 
France      8.9 9.3 12.5 7.9 1.70 
Germany     4.8 10.9 16.6 9.5 0.84 
Ireland     5.3 5.3 12.8 15.4 1.84 
Italy       5.1 5.2 13 6.8 1.20 
Japan        3.0 13.5 3.9 1.39 
Luxembourg  8.0 9.6 20 10.5 1.69 
Netherlands 11.0 7.6 15 5.8 1.53 
New Zealand 14.0 21.0 15 34 2.01 
Norway      10.3 15.2 10 13.6 1.87 
Spain       4.9 4.9 15 7.8 1.18 
Sweden      3.2 19.2 16 8.8 1.73 
Switzerland 9.1 8.9 14.5 5.5 1.48 
U.K.        11.9 20.7 10 28.3 1.71 
U.S.        15.9 21.5 14.9 58.2 2.02 
 
Source: 
1. UN Demographic Year-Book, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, table 11. 
2. Recent Demographic Developments in Europe 2000, Council of Europe Publishing 
3. “Poverty Rates for Children by Family Type,” LIS Key Figures. From Web site: 
http://lisweb.ceps.lu/keyfigures/childpovrates.htm  
(Note: Ireland in “1986” and “around 1996” is data from 1987; Spain in “1986” and “around 1996” is data 
from 1990; Switzerland in “1986” and “around 1996” is data from 1992.) 
4. Information from various respondents (see appendix) 
 
Table B2 
Measures of GDP per capita, government receipts and social expenditure, 20 countries, 
1995 
 
country  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Australia   393886 30.2 11.0 15.1 5.54 56.1 14.70 16.01 0.26 
Austria     169981 45.3 17.7 26.2 6.38 62.0 7.26 9.12 0.12 
Belgium     221497 48.6 21.3 26.9 7.30 53.6 8.06 8.54 0.15 
Canada      666957 36.2 12.7 18.6 6.74 59.8 4.38 N/A 0.07 
Denmark     119924 51.9 20.7 30.8 6.79 40.6 6.04 12.6 0.15 
Finland     96342 45.5 22.3 31.1 5.69 42.8 8.74 13.16 0.20 
France      1200066 45.6 21.0 29.7 7.46 61.0 7.42 8.64 0.12 
Germany     1744059 43.9 16.5 27.5 7.96 65.8 4.38 7.17 0.07 
Ireland     63956 34.4 13.5 19.1 5.38 44.6 8.09 8.74 0.18 
Italy       1143390 43.3 19.0 23.7 5.39 69.1 1.82 2.24 0.03 
Japan       2842472 28.8 13.4 14.0 5.64 80.2 1.46 3.07 0.02 
Luxembourg  13842 N/A N/A 23.9 5.82 53.7 9.96 11.67 0.19 
Netherlands 328096 45.0 22.5 26.6 6.45 48.5 3.71 5.02 0.08 
New Zealand 62218 N/A N/A 18.9 5.64 58.8 10.93 11.44 0.19 
Norway      101613 45.4 15.8 27.6 6.65 45.0 8.18 13.53 0.18 
Spain       597064 35.5 15.1 20.7 5.49 65.4 1.24 1.62 0.02 
Sweden      169571 51.4 22.5 33.0 7.19 42.6 6.45 11.67 0.15 
Switzerland 180841 47.6 11.1 21.0 6.97 63.6 5.01 N/A 0.08 
U.K.        1096228 N/A 5.9 22.5 5.90 54.2 8.32 10.46 0.15 
U.S.        7038400 31.1 12.2 16.1 6.26 74.2 2.11 4.09 0.03 
 
Note: 
1. GDP per capita in US $ PPP  
2. Public revenue as percentage of GDP  
3. Transfers as percentage of GDP  
4. Social security expenditure percentage of GDP 
5. Public expenditure on health, percentage of GDP 
6. Percentage of old age and health in social expenditure 
7. Family cash benefit percentage of social expenditure 
8. Percentage (family cash + service) in social expenditure 
9. Family cash benefit/(old age + health) 
 
Source: OECD HEALTH DATA 2000. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF 29 COUNTRIES. 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Paris, France. OECD publications. 2000 
 Table B3 
Labour market status of women in 1986 and 1995, and fertility measures in 1995, 20 
countries 
 
Country 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Australia   39.5 42.7 69.2 2955 43.2 56.6 43.5 82.0 
Austria     39.4 42.7 84.2 3595 42.8 46.7 58.7 79.0 
Belgium     40.5 43.4 82.3 3572 41.9 61.7 69.0 75.0 
Canada      42.5 45.0 68.8 3096 45.4 64.5 60.7 82.0 
Denmark     46.4 45.7 68.1 3112 45.5 85.2 69.8 85.0 
Finland     46.2 47.1 64.2 3024 48.0 70.9 65.8 73.0 
France      42.1 44.6 79.1 3528 44.4 68.9 83.2 79.0 
Germany     39.0 42.6 86.3 3676 42.5 41.5 40.6 73.0 
Ireland     30.8 37.7 72.4 2729 37.9 32.2 23.0 71.0 
Italy       35.6 36.6 70.8 2591 35.3 41.4 69.8 79.0 
Japan       39.8 40.5 70.2 2843 40.5 54.7 88.3 45.0 
Luxembourg  50.0 36.3 89.2 3238 36.2 45.4 74.1 56.0 
Netherlands 34.5 41.4 76.5 3167 40.9 52.6 40.5 75.0 
New Zealand 43.8 44.2 74.7 3302 44.3 58.5 27.1 68.0 
Norway      42.9 45.7 80.7 3688 46.5 77.9 61.6 87.0 
Spain       N/A 38.0 77.1 2930 34.8 38.4 68.8 67.0 
Sweden      47.7 47.9 76.8 3679 48.3 81.1 70.8 89.0 
Switzerland 37.1 40.9 83.9 3432 40.6 N/A N/A N/A 
U.K.        41.0 43.8 81.8 3583 44.9 62.8 41.7 68.0 
U.S.        43.8 45.7 68.7 3140 46.1 64.5 60.7 68.0 
  
Note: 
1. Percentage of female in labour force, in 1986 
2. Percentage of female in labour force, in 1995 
3. Percentage of female in part-time* labour force, in 1995 
4. Index = product of 2 and 3 
5. Percentage of female in full-time labour force, in 1995 
6. Percentage of labour participation of married cohabiting mothers 
7. Percentage of labour participation of lone mothers 
8. Female earnings as percentage of male earnings 
* Part-time employment refers to persons who work lass than 30 hours per week in their main job. Data 
include only persons declaring usual hours worked. 
 
Sources: 
1. OECD, Labour Force Statistics, 2001, Pp 23, 39 
2. From OECD Historical Statistics 1970-1999, 2000 
3. OECD HEALTH DATA 2000 
4. Bradshaw and Bjonberg, 1997: 275-276 
5. Evelyne Huber, Charles Ragin, and John D. Stephens. Comparative Welfare States Data Set. 
Northwestern University and University of North Carolina, 1997. For details, see: 
http://www.lisproject.org/publications/welfaredata/welfareaccess.htm 
Table B4 
Indicators of child custody, state involvement in child support, 20 countries 
 
Country  A B C D E F G 
Australia 5 2 0 69 19 8 4 
Austria 5 2 0 75 15 10 0 
Belgium 5 3 1 NA NA 60 NA 
Canada 3 2 0 61 11 28 0 
Denmark 5 3 1 NA NA 60 NA 
Finland 5 3 1 8 1 91 0 
France 5 3 1 11 2 87 0 
Germany 5 3 0 22 2 76 1 
Ireland 2 3 0 NA NA 10 NA 
Italy 1 1 0 91 5 4 1 
Japan 1 1 0 80 16 0 4 
Luxembourg NA 2 0 NA NA 10 NA 
Netherlands 5 3 0 NA NA 65 NA 
New Zealand 5 2 1 74 13 13 0 
Norway 5 3 1 9 1 90 0 
Spain 1 1 0 NA NA 10 NA 
Sweden 5 3 1 9 0.4 90 0.6 
Switzerland 2 2 0 85 11 3 1 
United Kingdom 1 2 0 90 10 0 0 
United States 3 2 0 68 12 20 0 
 
Note: 
A. Extent of joint custody:  
1 = not permitted or under 5%;  
2 = 5-14%;  
3 = 15-34%;  
4 = 35-59%;  
5 =60% or higher, or default condition. 
B. Extent of state involvement in ensuring child support:  
1 = minimal;  
2 = enforcement of child support;  
3 = advance maintenance payments. 
C. Extent of differential support for lone parents (see text):  
0 = minimal. 
1 = significant 
D. Custody arrangements: percent mother only 
E. Custody arrangements: percent father only 
F. Custody arrangements: joint 
G. Custody arrangements: other 
 
Sources: 
1. Information from various informants (see Appendix A)  
2. Joint custody has been estimated by the author based on other information for Belgium, Denmark, 
Luxembourg and Spain. 
 
Figure 1. The poverty rate for children in lone-mother families
                   by fertility rate under 20, in 18 countries, 1996
fertility under 20
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Figure 2. The poverty rate for children in lone-mother families
by public revenue as percentage of GDP, in 16 countries, 1996
public revenue as % of GDP
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Figure 3. The poverty rate for children in lone-mother families by
labour participation rate of lone mothers, in 18 countries, 1996
% of labour participation of lone mothers
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Figure 4. The poverty rate for children in lone-mother families by
the extent of joint custody, in 19 countries, 1996
% of joint custody arrangement
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 Figure 5. The poverty rate for children in lone-mother families by ex-
tent of state involvement in insuring child support, 19 countries, 1996
The extent of state involvement in insuring child support:
1=minimal;2=enforcement of child supporrt;3=advance maintenance payments
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Figure 6. The poverty rate for children in lone-mother families by the
differential state support for lone parents, in 19 countries, 1996
Differential state support for lone-mother families:
0 = minimal; 1 = significant 
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